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Background: In research on theory of mind (ToM), false belief paradigms are commonly used. Previous studies have
reported that there is heterogeneity in the magnitude of impairment on false belief tasks. Moreover, intact ability to
attribute others’ false beliefs has been widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia. Increasingly, evidence
suggests that there may be different cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding others’ false beliefs versus
applying one’s knowledge of others’ false beliefs. Since the role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an
important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizophrenia, we examined both remitted schizophrenia and non-
remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investigate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are associated with
deficits in understanding others’ mental states or difficulties in applying this understanding.
Methods: The present study investigated 29 patients with non-remitted schizophrenia, 19 patients with remitted
schizophrenia, and 22 healthy controls with a revised computerized referential communication task. The ability to
understand others’ false beliefs and the ability to apply others’ false beliefs were measured separately.
Results: Patients with non-remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than patients with remitted
schizophrenia and healthy controls on a task of understanding others’ false beliefs, whereas no significant difference
was found between the patients with remitted schizophrenia and healthy controls. Both the patients with non-
remitted schizophrenia and patients with remitted schizophrenia performed significantly worse than healthy controls
on a task of applying others’ false beliefs.
Conclusions: Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding others’ false beliefs from applying others’ false
beliefs in remitted schizophrenia. We preliminarily conclude that deficits in the ToM ability of applying knowledge of
others’ mental states might be state-dependent.
Keywords: Theory of mind, Schizophrenia, False belief, Referential communication task, Perspective takingBackground
Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to under-
stand others’ mental states, such as beliefs, and inten-
tions [1]. In the ToM field, false belief paradigms are
commonly used. In a typical false belief task, an agent is
depicted as having a belief that is inconsistent with
reality (e.g., believing that a ball is in a basket when it is* Correspondence: xubaihua305@126.com
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reproduction in any medium, provided the oractually in a box), leading to a behavior that is incompat-
ible with reality (e.g., looking for the ball in the basket).
This task is used to investigate whether participants can
predict an agent’s behavior based on the agent’s belief,
despite knowing that the belief is inconsistent with
reality. Studies in children using an elicited-response
false belief task (e.g., the Sally-Anne false belief task) [2]
suggest that four-year-old children can predict others’
behavior based on others’ false beliefs, whereas three-
year-old children typically cannot [3-5]. However, deve-
lopmental theorists using spontaneous-response falsetd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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attribute others’ false beliefs is already present by the
second year of life [2,6,7]. In these tasks, children’s
understanding of others’ false beliefs is inferred from
their spontaneous behaviors while they watch a scene
unfold. For example, Onishi and Baillargeon [6] found
that 15-month-old infants looked reliably longer when
the agent searched for an object in one of two boxes
when the agent falsely believed it to be in other box,
suggesting that 15-month-old infants have the ability to
understand others’ false beliefs. One explanation for
these findings, the “response account,” holds that
younger children fail the elicited-response false belief
task because of difficulties in executing the response-
selection and response-inhibition processes, but not in
executing the false-belief-representation process [2].
Failure or processing costs in executing false belief
tasks have also been reported in normal adults. Keysar
et al. reported that normal adults did not reliably use
others’ false beliefs to interpret their behavior in a refer-
ential communication task [8]. Other studies replicated
the findings from Keysar et al. [8], and further suggested
that applying knowledge of others’ false beliefs appears
to require effort to complete [9,10]. On the contrary,
several studies have suggested that the false-belief repre-
sentation process might be automatic or spontaneous in
normal adults. For example, Kovács et al. [11] found that
participants’ reaction times in a visual object detection
task were modulated by the false beliefs of a fictional
agent even when participants were aware that the agent’s
beliefs were unrelated to the task, suggesting that partic-
ipants computed the agent’s beliefs automatically. Simi-
larly, Cohen and German found that adults’ tendency to
parse events involving a human agent in terms of the
agent’s belief was unintentional [12,13]. Back and
Apperly also found that belief ascription may occur
spontaneously [14]. Considering studies from normal
children and adults, it seems that there may be different
cognitive mechanisms underlying the understanding
others’ false beliefs versus applying knowledge of others’
false beliefs.
Since Frith proposed that psychotic symptoms in
schizophrenia might be explained by ToM impairments
[15], numerous studies have examined ToM in schizo-
phrenia. While there is no doubt that schizophrenia pa-
tients perform poorly on ToM tasks, these studies have
produced some variable findings. For example, studies
have reported that there is heterogeneity in the magni-
tude of impairment on false belief tasks [16,17]. More-
over, inconsistent findings on false belief tasks have been
widely reported in patients with remitted schizophrenia.
For instance, Corcoran et al. [18] found that patients
who were symptom free showed normal performance on
a task of understanding others’ false beliefs from visualjokes. Other studies have also reported intact ability to
understand others’ false beliefs in patients with remitted
schizophrenia [19-22], suggesting that ToM deficits in
schizophrenia are state dependent. In contrast, other
studies have found that subjects with remitted schizo-
phrenia performed poorly on the false belief picture-
sequencing task [23,24]. For example, Inoue et al. [23]
reported the patients in remission after the first episode
of schizophrenia showed impairment on the false belief
picture sequencing task, suggesting ToM deficits as a
trait characteristic of schizophrenia.
In light of the findings among normal children and
adults on false belief tasks, we speculate that differences
in the nature of the tasks used to assess ToM might con-
found these results. Succeeding in false belief picture-
sequencing tasks requires participants to rearrange the
cards according the character’s false belief, which in-
volves not only understanding others’ false beliefs but
also the ability to apply this knowledge of others’ false
beliefs. Considering studies from remitted schizophrenia,
we hypothesized that patients with remitted schizophre-
nia may be impaired in applying their knowledge of
others’ false beliefs but have intact ability to understand
others’ false beliefs. Our hypothesis is consistent with
previous findings [25,26]. Champagne-Lavau et al. [25]
found that schizophrenia patients had problems using
information they shared with the experimenter in a
referential communication task. In particular, McCabe
et al. [26] reported that the patients with chronic schizo-
phrenia retained erroneous beliefs despite recognizing
that their interlocutor did not share their belief or accept
their justifications of these beliefs as convincing. These
findings suggest that the problems facing these patients
are not understanding others’ beliefs, but application of
the knowledge of others’ mental states.
Thus, we conducted the present study to explore ToM
ability in schizophrenia using a decompositional ap-
proach. A revised computerized referential communica-
tion task was adopted to investigate separately the ability
to understand another’s false beliefs and the ability to
apply understanding of the other’s false beliefs. Since the
role of psychotic symptoms in ToM impairments is an
important issue in the study of ToM deficits in schizo-
phrenia [15], we examined both remitted schizophrenia
and non-remitted schizophrenia, with the aim to investi-
gate whether psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia are
associated with deficits in understanding others’ mental
states or difficulties in applying this understanding.
Method
Participants
Forty-eight patients with schizophrenia were recruited
from the Seventh Hospital of Hangzhou (the largest
psychiatric hospital of Zhejiang province) and the local
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The diagnosis of schizophrenia was determined by two
experienced psychiatrists (YW and YM) according to the
criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 4th ED. [27]. Patients who had a
current or past diagnosis of substance dependence, a
severe medical or neurological condition, or other
clinical pathologies that could be associated with poor
social functioning were excluded. The patients were
divided into a schizophrenia-non-remitted group (n=29)
and a schizophrenia-remitted group (n=19) according to
Andreasen’s remission criteria [28]. To serve as a control
group, twenty-two normal healthy adults with no psychi-
atric history were recruited from the local community.
All healthy adults met the following inclusion criteria:
(a) no history of head injury, CNS disease or psychiatric
illness, and (b) no evidence of current substance (includ-
ing alcohol) abuse. All participants were over 18 years of
age. They all had normal vision and hearing. All partici-
pants were right-handed.
All participants in this study gave written, informed
consent. Consent was obtained from the person in
Figure 1 to publish the image in Figure 1.
Measurements
Revised computerized referential communication task
A revised computerized referential communication task
was used to investigate the ability to understand others’
false beliefs and to apply this understanding [10]. During
each trial of the computerized referential communicationDuration=1000ms
False belief 
command trials
Reality   
command trials
Figure 1 Examples of false belief command trials and reality comman
continued and a statement was presented until a response was made. In e
in the non-secretive boxes (No. 1 to 7) and the labels on the secretive box
ZhangHong has false belief for the content of box No. 8 and box No. 9.task, a photograph was shown (Figure 1 left). Each photo-
graph contains nine boxes (seven non-secretive boxes and
two secretive boxes) with a different fruit in each box.
Above each of the two secretive boxes is written a label
supposedly indicating the name of the fruit in the box. In
the top-left of the photograph is a picture of a fictional
character, ZhangHong. The label above each secretive box
is inconsistent with the content of the box. Participants
were told that ZhangHong cannot see the content of
secretive boxes, but can see the labels above the boxes as
well as the content of the non-secretive boxes, which
results in ZhangHong having false beliefs about the
contents of the two secretive boxes. In addition, one of
the secretive boxes is a critical secretive box for which the
label corresponds to the content of the other secretive box
(e.g., In Figure 1, the label of the No. 8 box corresponds to
the contents of the No. 9 box).
Applying others’ false beliefs
In the task of applying others’ false beliefs, a statement
was presented at the top of the photograph (Figure 1
right), and participants were instructed that this was a
command given to ZhangHong. Participants were ins-
tructed to take ZhangHong’s perspective and to predict
her behavior. Nine “false belief command trials” and 18
“reality command trials” were presented. In the false
belief command trials, the command statement referred
to the fruit that is named on the critical secretive box
but which is actually inside the other secretive box (e.g.,
“Please choose which box contains the banana.” Figure 1.Maximum Response Time=20000ms
d trials. Fist, a photograph was presented. The photograph was
ach photograph, the character named ZhangHong can see the fruits
es (No. 8 and No. 9), but not the fruit inside the secretive boxes.
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the ZhangHong’s mental states, they would choose the
critical secretive box as the box that ZhangHong would
select (e.g., ZhangHong would incorrectly select the No.
8 box in Figure 1 in response to the command, “Please
choose which box contains the banana.”). In the reality
command trials, the statement made to ZhangHong
referred to one of the other seven boxes (e.g., “Please
choose which box contains the apple.” Figure 1 bottom-
right), in which her belief corresponds with reality. To
respond correctly in reality command trials, participants
only needed to choose the target box according to their
own knowledge of the contents of the seven non-
secretive boxes. False belief command trials and reality
command trials were presented in a pseudorandom
order, avoiding consecutive false belief command trials
in order to reduce the likelihood of participants inferring
the purpose of the experiment. Participants were
required to make each choice using the numbers on a
numerical keyboard, and to be as accurate and fast as
possible.
Understanding others’ false beliefs
In the task of understanding others’ false beliefs, the
experimental features were identical to those used in the
task of applying others’ false beliefs with the exception
of the command statements and response type. Two
types of statements were used: false belief probes in
which participants were asked to judge the accuracy of
ZhangHong’s belief about the contents of specific boxes
(e.g., “ZhangHong thinks that a banana is in box 8.”) and
reality probes in which participants were asked to judge
the truth about the contents of specific boxes (e.g., “In
fact, the apple is in box 1.”). Participants were explicitly
instructed that the probe statements are about either the
truth of what is in the box or ZhangHong’s belief about
what in the box. The participants were required to pro-
vide a “yes” or “no” button-press response to judge the
accuracy of each probe sentence, and to be as accurate
and fast as possible. A total of 9 false belief probes about
the character’s false beliefs were presented in the trials
corresponding to the false belief command trials in the
task of applying others’ false beliefs. A total of 18 reality
probes about the reality information were presented in
the trials corresponding to the reality command trials in
the task of applying others’ false beliefs. For false belief
probes, 4 correct answers were “yes” and 5 correct an-
swers were “no”. For reality probes, the answers were
equally “yes” and “no”.
Task procedure
The task procedure began with a name familiarization
task for the ten kinds of fruits used in the experiment
followed by the task of applying others’ false beliefs.Finally, all participants were administered the task of
understanding others’ false beliefs. Before the formal
experimental trials of the task of applying or under-
standing others’ false beliefs, four practice reality
command/probe trials were administered to familiarize
the participants with the task. The experiment was
presented with DMDX software. Only the rate of accu-
racy for each condition was entered into the final
analyses.
Clinical evaluation
Information on sex, age, years of education, Chlorpro-
mazine (CPZ) equivalents and length of illness was
confirmed by psychiatrists and study researchers.
Psychopathology was assessed using the Positive and
Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) [29] for patients by
experienced clinicians. Social functioning was evaluated
using the Chinese version of the Personal and Social
Performance Scale (PSP) [30] for patients by psychia-
trists who have received training on the use of the PSP.
Neuropsychological background tests and IQ Test
Since previous studies have reported that ToM deficits
in schizophrenia were associated with impairments
on IQ, executive functioning, and working memory
[16,17,31], neuropsychological (i.e., the Verbal Fluency
Test and The Digit Span Test) and IQ tests were admin-
istered to patients. The Verbal Fluency Test (VFT) was
used to assess executive functioning and required
patients to name vegetables within 1 min. The total
score the patient could receive on the VFT was the
number of vegetables named. The Digit Span Test
(DST) was used to assess working memory including the
Digit Span Forward Test and the Digit Span Backward
Test. In the Digit Span Test, a series of lists of numbers
is presented verbally to participants. The participant is
asked to recall the numbers in ascending numerical
order (forward) or descending numerical order (back-
ward). The total score is the number of lists that are
correctly remembered in ascending numerical order and
descending numerical order. The Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Revised Chinese Version (WAIS-RC)
[32] was administered as a measure of intelligence for
patients.
Results
Demographic, clinical data, and performance on
neuropsychological tests
Table 1 summarizes the demographic characteristics,
clinical data, and performance on neuropsychological
tests for each group. Pearson’s Chi-square test was
carried out to assess the Sex Ratio among groups.
Parametric one-way analyses variance (ANOVAs) were
performed for Index age, Educational level, Length of
Table 1 Comparisons of demographic data, clinical data, and performance on neuropsychological tests among groups
Healthy controls Remitted schizophrenia Non-remitted schizophrenia Statistics
(n=22) (n=19) (n=29)
Sex ratio (M: F) 9:13 8:11 13:16 χ2=0.084, P=0.959
Index age (years) 31.86±5.36 34.89±5.26 31.86±12.73 F(2,138)=0.756, P=0.473
Educational level (years) 11.05±1.73 10.47±2.37 11.52±2.59 F(2,138)=1.198, P=0.308
Length of illness (years) 11.68±6.06 8.17±9.64 F(1,47)=1.996, P=0.164
CPZ equivalents (mg) 326.84±157.13 309.48±164.40 F(1,47)=0.132, P=0.718
PSP total score 65.37±7.31 57.07±17.12 F(1,47)=3.966, P=0.052
PANSS
General symptoms 24.68±3.40 31.17±5.56 F(1,47)=20.693, P<0.001
Positive symptoms 13.11±2.60 16.41±4.24 F(1,47)=9.251, P=0.004
Negative symptoms 16.11±2.28 18.21±4.21 F(1,47)=3.949, P=0.053
VFT total score 16.89±4.85 16.41±5.00 F(1,47)=0.109, P=0.743
DST total score 11.11±1.91 11.55±2.54 F(1,47)=0.426, P=0.517
IQ 96.32±11.60 97.90±10.35 F(1,47)=0.243, P=0.624
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symptoms, PANSS Positive symptoms, PANSS Negative
symptoms, VFT total score, DST total score and IQ. The
levels of statistical significance were set at least at
P < 0.05.
The non-remitted schizophrenia group had higher
scores than remitted schizophrenia group on the PANSS
General symptoms scales [F(1,47)=20.693, P<0.001] and
PANSS Positive symptom scales [F(1,47)=9.251, P=0.004].
The differences between the non-remitted and remitted
schizophrenia groups on the PSP [F(1,47)=3.966, P=0.052]
and PANSS Negative symptoms scales [F(1,47)=3.949,
P=0.053] approached statistical significance. No other
significant differences were found between the remitted
and non-remitted schizophrenia groups or among the
three groups (all Ps>0.16).
Performance on the revised computerized referential
communication task
Table 2 summarizes the rates of accuracy for each condition
on the revised computerized referential communicationTable 2 Comparisons of rate of accuracy for each condition o
task among groups
Healthy controls Remitted schizophr
(n=22) (n=19)
Task of applying
False belief command 0.87±0.13 0.32±0.40
Reality command 0.99±0.02 0.99±0.03
Task of understanding
False belief probe 0.97±0.05 0.87±0.25
Reality probe 0.99±0.02 0.98±0.03task among groups. A multiple one-way ANOVA was first
conducted for rate of accuracy among groups. Post-hoc
Bonferroni corrections were used to correct for multiple
comparisons. The levels of statistical significance were set
at least at P < 0.05.
For the task of applying understanding of false beliefs,
a significant main effect for group was found on belief
command trials [F(2,138)=22.204, P<0.001], but not for
reality command trials [F(2,138)=1.230, P=0.299]. Post-
hoc comparisons (Bonferroni corrected) showed that both
the remitted schizophrenia group (P<0.001) and the non-
remitted schizophrenia group (P<0.001) performed worse
than healthy controls on false belief command trials. No
other post-hoc comparisons were statistically significant
(all Ps>0.364). For the task of understanding false beliefs, a
significant main effect for group was found on false belief
probe trials [F(2,138)=16.586, P<0.001], but not on reality
probe trials [F(2,138)=1.441, P=0.244]. Post-hoc compari-
sons (Bonferroni corrected) showed that the non-remitted
schizophrenia group performed worse than both the
remitted schizophrenia group (P=0.001) and healthyn the revised computerized referential communication
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significant differences between groups were found during
post-hoc comparisons (all Ps>0.302). To examine further
the significant difference between the non-remitted and
remitted schizophrenia groups on the task of applying
false beliefs, we added the rate of accuracy of false belief
probe trials as a covariate into the an ANCOVA to
exclude the possibility that failure in applying false beliefs
was due to lack of understanding of others’ false beliefs. A
significant difference was still found between the non-
remitted and remitted schizophrenia groups on the task of
applying false beliefs [F(1,47)=2.84, P=0.027].
Correlations between performance on false belief trials,
neurocognitive domain scores and clinical variables in
schizophrenia
Since previous research has documented that IQ [16,17],
antipsychotic treatment [33], length of illness [34], work-
ing memory [16,17,30], and executive functioning
[16,17] are associated with ToM deficits in schizophre-
nia, Pearson’s correlations were conducted between
performance on false belief trials, neurocognitive domain
scores and clinical variables in schizophrenia partici-
pants. These variables included the rate of accuracy on
trials of false belief probe, rate of accuracy on trials of
false belief command, PSP total score, PANSS General
symptoms, PANSS Positive symptoms, PANSS Negative
symptoms, IQ, CPZ equivalents, Length of illness, VFT
total score, and DST total score. Since a large number of
correlations were examined in this analysis, the levels of
statistical significance were set at least at P < 0.01 to
limit the possibility of a Type I error. All correlations are














False Belief Probe 0.598* −0.066 −0.066 −0.368**














*P< 0.01; **P= 0.01.The correlation between rate of accuracy on trials of
false belief probe and PANSS General symptoms
(r=−0.368, P=0.010) approached statistical significance.
There was a significant positive correlation between rate
of accuracy on trials of false belief probe and accuracy
on trials of false belief command (r=0.598, P<0.001), a
significant positive correlation between PANSS General
symptoms and PANSS Negative symptoms (r=0.447,
P=0.001), and a significant negative correlation between
IQ and Length of illness (r=0.387, P=0.007). There was a
significant negative correlation between PSP total score
and PANSS General symptoms (r=−0.397, P=0.005), and a
significant negative correlation between PSP total score
and PANSS Positive symptoms (r=−0.599, P<0.001). There
was a significant positive correlation between DST total
score and VFT total score (r=0.425, P=0.003). No other
significant correlations were found.
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study using a referen-
tial communication task to investigate two aspects of
ToM ability (i.e., understanding others’ false beliefs and
applying understanding of others’ false beliefs) in pa-
tients with schizophrenia. Our results show patients with
non-remitted schizophrenia performed more poorly than
controls in understanding another’s false belief, whereas
no significant difference was found between remitted
schizophrenia patients and controls. These findings are
consistent with previous studies [18-22] in which remit-
ted schizophrenia patients have exhibited intact ability
to attribute others’ false beliefs. However, our results
seem to contradict a study by Mo et al. [35], which
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0.036 0.210 0.169 −0.013 0.107




Wang et al. BMC Psychiatry 2013, 13:141 Page 7 of 9
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-244X/13/141performed worse than controls in a first-order false be-
lief task. We speculate that this inconsistency may be
the result of Mo et al.’s first-order false belief task
involving more processing demands. In Mo et al.’s study
[35], their first-order false belief task required partici-
pants to predict the characters’ behavior based on their
false belief. According to the “response account,”
reviewed earlier, succeeding in this type task requires
not only the ability of false-belief-representation, but
also the ability to execute the response-selection and
response-inhibition processes [2]. In our task of under-
standing others’ false beliefs, the false belief probes were
repeatedly presented to participants. Participants only
provided a “yes” or “no” response to each probe. Thus,
the simplicity of our task requirement might reduce the
probability of participants responding incorrectly to false
belief probes due to their prior knowledge of reality.
Our results show that patients with non-remitted
schizophrenia and individuals with remitted schizophre-
nia performed significantly worse than controls on a task
of applying knowledge of others’ false beliefs. While the
experimental instruction had explicitly directed partici-
pants to take ZhangHong’s perspective during the task,
patients with schizophrenia seemed to not consider the
character’s belief about the contents in secretive-boxes.
Our results are consistent with a previous study [25,36],
which indicated that patients with schizophrenia had
difficulties in taking others’ perspective. The findings are
also consistent with previous studies using false belief
picture-sequencing tasks [37-39]. Patients with schizo-
phrenia performed poorly on this type of task that
required the ability to apply others’ false beliefs. Based
on these considerations, our results provide further
evidence that schizophrenia is associated with a specific
deficit in applying knowledge of others’ mental states.
The deficit of applying others’ mental states may be an
appropriate intervention target for schizophrenia during
remission.
Our results also show no significant correlations
between understanding/applying false beliefs and neuro-
cognitive domain scores and clinical variables, including
IQ, CPZ equivalents, Length of illness, VFT total score,
and DST total score. We speculate that the lack of influ-
ence of these other variables may be due in part to the
simplicity of our task. Moreover, we also added the rate
of accuracy of false belief probe trials as a covariate into
the ANCOVA for applying false beliefs. Thus, the differ-
ence in applying false beliefs between the two schizo-
phrenia groups could not be completely accounted for
by the inability to understand others’ false beliefs in
non-remitted schizophrenia. Regarding the improvement
in applying false beliefs found in remitted schizophrenia,
we speculate this difference was due to a treatment
effect from antipsychotic medication. Previous literaturehas reported that improvements on tasks involve apply-
ing false beliefs were observed when clozapine or
olanzapine was administered [40].
Our results seem to support a dissociation of under-
standing others’ false beliefs from applying knowledge of
others’ false belief in remitted schizophrenia. Patients
with remitted schizophrenia showed deficits in applying
others’ false beliefs, but appeared to retain normal ability
in understanding others’ false beliefs. This conclusion
might help to clarify confusion in the literature regard-
ing whether ToM impairments in schizophrenia are
trait-dependent or state-dependent. Evidence supporting
a trait-dependent view of ToM impairments comes
largely from studies in which false belief tasks required
participants to use their knowledge of others’ false
beliefs. For instance, studies by Langdon and Coltheart
[41], Inoue et al. [23], and Anselmetti et al. [42] sug-
gested that poor performance in schizophrenia on a false
belief picture-sequencing task is attributable to stable,
illness-related biological factors. On the contrary, the
studies reporting a lack of association between ToM im-
pairment and remitted schizophrenia primarily have
used tasks that assess whether patients could understand
others’ false belief [18-22]. Our results show that perfor-
mances on a task of understanding others’ false belief
was negatively associated with PANSS General symp-
toms, whereas no significant correlations were found
between performance on a task of applying others’ false
belief and general symptoms scores, positive symptoms
scores or negative symptoms scores. These results might
be explained by Frith’s proposal that schizophrenia is a
“meta-representational disorder” that is only present
in patients without remission [15], suggesting a state-
related impairment. On the other hand, our results seem
to indicate that defective ability to apply others’ mental
states may be trait-dependent. However, the exact cogni-
tive mechanisms underlying their disability of applying
others’ false belief remain unclear. For example, we
cannot exclude the possibility that difficulty in applying
others’ false belief in schizophrenia was due to their
limitation of generic executive processes, as proposed by
Apperly et al. [10], which was used to explain the reason
for normal adults’ failure in a similar task paradigm.
Therefore, we preliminarily conclude that deficits in the
ToM ability to attribute others’ mental states may be
state-dependent, whereas deficits of the ToM ability to
apply knowledge of others’ mental states may be trait-
dependent.
The present study has two main limitations. First, no
closely matched control tasks were adopted. Thus, no
conclusions can be drawn regarding whether the
patients’ poor performances on the task of applying
others’ false belief are specific or of the result of general
cognitive deficits in inhibiting interference. Secondly, in
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stand others’ false belief and to apply this understanding
were investigated, limiting our ability to compare our
findings with results in previous studies using other
types of mentalizsing tasks. However, in spite of these
limitations, our findings may help to clarify findings in
previous studies using false belief tasks.
Conclusions
In summary, we investigated separately the ability to
understand others’ false beliefs and the ability to apply
understanding of the others’ false beliefs in both remit-
ted schizophrenia and non-remitted schizophrenia with
a revised computerized referential communication task.
Our findings suggested a dissociation of understanding
others’ false beliefs from applying others’ false beliefs in
remitted schizophrenia. Though further work must be
performed to determine the exact cognitive mechanisms
underlying their disability of applying others’ false beliefs,
present study might help to better understand the ToM
deficits in schizophrenia.
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